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UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE FOR HIT-AND-RuN VEHICLES: TIE
REQUIREMENT OF PHYSICAL CONTACT
INTRODUCTION
Although virtually every state regulates uninsured motorist coverage,
a significant amount of nonconformity exists regarding the statutory
requirements of uninsured motorist coverage and the interpretation of
these requirements. This is true particularly in cases involving hit-and-
run vehicles. Most automobile insurance policies provide coverage for
victims of hit-and-run drivers. The policies, however, require the insured
to prove physical contact between the insured's vehicle and the hit-and-
run vehicle. Because of this requirement, the policies do not provide
coverage for victims of negligent miss-and-run drivers. This comment
focuses on the purpose, validity, and interpretation of the physical
contact requirement in Louisiana, as well as the problems that arise out
of its enforcement. In addition, the comment explores the positions
taken by several other jurisdictions on the validity of the physical contact
requirement. Finally, a solution is offered to some of the difficulties
caused by the requirement.
STATUTORY REQUIREMENT
Louisiana, by statute, requires insurers to make uninsured motorist
coverage available to purchasers of automobile liability insurance. Louis-
iana Revised Statutes 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(i) provides:
No automobile liability insurance covering liability arising out
of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motcr vehicle
shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state . . . unless
coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less
than the limits of bodily injury liability provided by the policy
... for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured or underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily in-
jury, sickness, or disease, including death, resulting therefrom;
provided, however, that the coverage required under this Sub-
section shall not be applicable where any insured named in the
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policy shall reject in writing, as provided herein, the coverage
or selects lower limits.'
By requiring the insurer to afford protection to victims of the
negligence of uninsured motorists, the statute serves two general pur-
poses. First of all, the statute helps to ensure that the innocent victims
of negligent drivers receive some compensation. A second and related
purpose is the preservation of public resources, for uncompensated vic-
tims may easily become wards of the state. 2
The statute requires insurers who issue automobile liability policies
to provide coverage for personal injuries caused by negligent uninsured
motorists. It does not expressly require coverage for hit-and-run, miss-
and-run, or unidentified motor vehicles. The question becomes whether
the statute applies only to situations in which the identity of the negligent
motorist is known and that motorist is actually uninsured, or whether
it also affords protection when the identity of the negligent motorist is
unknown. The courts of other states with similar statutes have required
protection even when the offending vehicle is unknown,3 Louisiana courts
have so far limited mandatory coverage to instances where an identified
negligent motorist has no insurance.4 Despite Louisiana's interpretation
of the statute, most automobile policies do provide coverage for hit-
and-run accidents, but only in cases where there is physical contact
between the hit-and-run vehicle and the insured or his vehicle.
POLICY REQUIREMENT OF PHYSICAL CONTACT
Coverage under most uninsured motorist provisions requires that an
"uninsured motor vehicle" cause the accident. Policies typically include
hit-and-run vehicles within the definition of "uninsured motor vehicle"
if there is physical contact between the hit-and-run vehicle and the insured
or a vehicle occupied by the insured.' The purpose behind this physical
contact requirement "is the prevention of fraudulent claims in which
the insured may claim the one-car accident was caused by some phantom
automobile." 6
1. La. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(aXi) (Supp. 1988).
2. Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 253 La. 521, 527, 218 So. 2d 580, 583 (1969).
See also Bosch v. Cummings, 520 So. 2d 721 (La. 1988).
3. Brown v. Progressive Mut. Ins. Co., 249 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1971).
4. Collins v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 234 So. 2d 270 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
writ denied, 256 La. 375, 236 So. 2d 503 (1970).
5. The 1988 Traveler's Car Insurance Policy defines an uninsured motor vehicle as
including "a hit-and-run highway vehicle, if neither the driver nor the owner can be
identified, which causes bodily injury to an insured by physical contact with the insured
or a vehicle occupied by the insured."
6. Harrison v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 471 So. 2d 922, 924 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1985). See also St. Amant v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 499 So. 2d 322, 325 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1986); Springer v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 311 So. 2d 36 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 313 So. 2d 598 (1975).
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The assumption underlying the policy requirement is that if the
insured can prove physical contact, his claim is more likely to be genuine.
If there was physical contact, then some evidence that another vehicle
was involved in the accident is almost certain to be available. By contrast,
the lack of tangible evidence in cases with no physical contact increases
the likelihood of fraudulent claims. To a certain extent these assumptions
are sound, because the added burden of proof imposed on the insured
by the contact requirement makes fabrication of a claim more difficult.
Further examination reveals serious problems with the rule and the
assumptions it is based upon. First of all, the rule is not foolproof. As
the first circuit noted in St. Amant v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.,
7
a motorist involved in a single car accident could damage his own car
so as to leave apparent proof that 'physical contact' occurred with a
non-existent phantom vehicle." ' Although the rule may make fraudulent
claims more difficult to bring, it does not prevent them.
Second, this inexact method of preventing fraud imposes costs on
society as a whole. Certainly prevention of fraud benefits both the
insurance company, and, through reduced rates, the insured public. There
are, however, certainly situations in which negligent motorists cause
accidents without physical contact. In these situations the contact re-
quirement has the effect of denying coverage for a genuine claim, leaving
accident victims uncompensated and burdening the state. In short, the
societal interest in compensating accident victims and in preventing those
victims from becoming public burdens undercuts the insurer's and the
insured public's interest in preventing fraud.
Finally, the physical contact rule is necessary only in those cases in
which the risk of fraud is great. The necessity of the physical contact
requirement becomes questionable when there is little or no risk of
fraudulent claims. For instance, suppose an unidentified vehicle forces
the insured's car off the road without making contact, and there are
credible witnesses to the incident. The clear proof that an accident
actually occurred as claimed minimizes the danger that the claim is
fraudulent. The assumptions that underlie the physical contact require-
ment are rebutted in this case, and the interests that justify the re-
quirement are not advanced. Given the policies behind the uninsured
motorists statute, it seems that coverage should be compelled in these
sorts of cases.9 Louisiana courts, however, have taken a different view.
7. 499 So. 2d 322 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
8. Id. at 325.
9. See J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 5095 (1981). "Furthermore, if
the social purposes is to compensate persons injured in automobile accidents and avoid
them becoming public charges, then the most functional form of coverage would be a
true accident policy-not some purported coverage enmeshed in a bundle of restrictions."
Id.
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Interpretation of the Statute
The fourth circuit's decision in Collins v. New Orleans Public Serv-
ice, Inc.'0 is the leading authority on the enforceability of the physical
contact requirement in cases involving unidentified vehicles. In the case,
an unidentified automobile pulled out in front of a bus in which the
plaintiff, Mrs. Collins, was a passenger. The bus stopped abruptly,
causing Mrs. Collins to fall and suffer injuries. The plaintiff did not
allege that the unidentified vehicle came into physical contact with the
bus. Because of this, argued the defense, the plaintiff had not proven
an essential element of uninsured motorist coverage. The trial court
agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance com-
pany. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the unidentified vehicle was
an uninsured motorist within the meaning of the statute, and, therefore,
that the physical contact requirement went beyond the provisions of La.
R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(i).
The fourth circuit upheld the validity of the physical contact re-
quirement. The court began with the proposition that "[tihe burden is
upon the plaintiffs to prove that the automobile which was a proximate
cause of the injuries in suit was in fact an uninsured automobile.""
The court further indicated that when the claimant could not prove that
the offending vehicle was in fact uninsured, which would always be the
case in an accident involving an unidentified motor vehicle, the statute
did not mandate coverage. Therefore, the hit-and-run provisions of the
policy were a voluntary extension of coverage by the insurance company.
Because no statute compelled coverage, the court went on to say, the
insurer could modify its contractual obligations freely. 2 The physical
contact requirement was only an exercise of that contractual freedom.
Although the Collins approach is plausible given the language of
the statute, the facts of the case illustrate the problem created by the
physical contact requirement. The insurance company conceded that the
accident happened as alleged by the plaintiff. There was no danger of
fraud, so the purpose behind the contact requirement was inapplicable.
Moreover, the policies behind the uninsured motorist statute, protecting
innocent accident victims and preventing them from becoming public
10. 234 So. 2d 270 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 256 La. 375, 236 So. 2d 503
(1970).
11. Id. at 272 (citing Vitrano v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 198 So. 2d 922
(La, App. 4th Cir. 1967); Roloff v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 191 So. 2d 901 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1966)).
12. Id. at 273.
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burdens, would seem to mandate coverage in such a case. But the court
refused to interpret the language of the statute in such a way that
coverage was required. The Louisiana Supreme Court refused writs,
finding "no error of law."' 3
The Collins decision rests on the premise that the term "uninsured
motor vehicle" in the statute is limited to vehicles that actually have
no insurance coverage. The term could, however, just as easily include
all vehicles that do not have insurance coverage available for the injured
person. When the identity of the offending driver and vehicle is un-
known, there is no insurance available for the benefit of the injured
plaintiff. Under this interpretation, contrary to Collins, the statute would
mandate coverage for hit-and-run accidents. Despite this equally ac-
ceptable reading, Louisiana courts have consistently upheld the Collins
interpretation. 4
The policies behind the uninsured motorist statute indicate that there
should be coverage when the insured is injured by an unidentified driver.
The interest in protecting accident victims is no less compelling when
the negligent motorist is unidentified than it is when his identity is
known and he does not have insurance. In fact, the interest is more
compelling. As far as victims are concerned, unidentified drivers have
no assets. The victim of negligent, unidentified drivers have no possibility
of recovering from the person who caused the harm.
Although the supreme court refused to review the Collins decision,
it has not spoken directly to the issue. Thus, the question whether the
uninsured motorist statute requires coverage against the negligence of
unidentified drivers when there is no physical contact is not settled. If
the case does come before the court, the court should reject the Collins
approach.
Relaxation of the Physical Contact Requirement
The courts have limited Collins in certain situations. For example,
the requirement of physical contact has sometimes been relaxed in cases
involving contact with intervening vehicles. Courts have held that when
an unidentified vehicle makes contact with an intervening vehicle, which
in turn makes contact with the insured's vehicle, the physical contact
requirement has been met. In Springer v. Government Employees In-
surance Co." an unidentified vehicle struck an intervening vehicle, caus-
13. Collins, 256 La. 375, 236 So. 2d 503 (1970).
14. Howes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 480 So. 2d 991 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985), writ denied,
484 So. 2d 672 (1986); Lemieux v. Prudential Ins. Co., 416 So. 2d 1347 (La. App. 1st
Cir.), writ denied, 420 So. 2d 454 (1982); Gex v. Doe, 391 So. 2d 69 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1980), writ denied, 396 So. 2d 899 (1981); Oliver v. Jones, 370 So. 2d 638 (La. App.
4th Cir.), aff'd, 376 So. 2d 1256 (1979).
15. 311 So. 2d 36 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 313 So. 2d 598 (1975).
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ing it to cross the median of a divided highway and to strike the
insured's oncoming vehicle. The fourth circuit, which had handed down
the Collins decision, held that:
the "physical contact of such vehicle" includes the physical
contact of that vehicle with an intermediate vehicle or other
object which, in the same mechanism of the accident, strikes
the assured's vehicle. We limit this to the type of factual situation
existent here. Specifically, the injury causing impact must have
a complete, proximate, direct and timely relationship with the
first impact between the hit-and-run vehicle and the intermediate
vehicle. In effect, the impact must be the result of an unbroken
chain of events with a clearly definable beginning and ending,
occurring in a continuous sequence.' 6
The basis for the court's holding is unclear, especially given its earlier
position in Collins.17 The insurance policy clearly required contact be-
tween the hit-and-run vehicle and either the insured or an automobile
occupied by the insured.'" This requirement was not met in this case,
for the intervening vehicle, not the hit-and-run vehicle, struck the in-
sured's car. The unknown vehicle did not touch either the insured or
the vehicle of the insured. The court concluded that the words meant
something they did not say. 19 The position taken by the fourth circuit
in Springer is inconsistent with its freedom of insurance contract pron-
ouncements in Collins.
2 0
Perhaps the fact that several independent witnesses corroborated the
occurrence of the accident's influenced the Springer court. There was
no danger of fraud. Moreover, since the intervening driver was found
not negligent, the plaintiff's only chance for recovery was against his
insurer.21 While later courts rationalized Springer on the "unbroken
chain of events" theory, 22 it seems to indicate some discomfort with
the Collins court's steadfast enforcement of the contact requirement.
Despite the relaxation, Louisiana courts have not yet completely
abandoned the contact requirement. A first circuit decision, Hensley v.
16. Id. at 39.
17. The only authority cited was a Michigan Court of Appeal case, Lord v. Auto
Owners Ins. Co., 22 Mich. App. 669, 177 N.W.2d 653 (1970).
18. Springer, 311 So. 2d at 39.
19. See id. at 42 (Schott, J., dissenting).
20. Collins held that coverage for hit-and-run accidents could be restricted in any
way. 234 So. 2d at 273.
21. In Collins, the insured sued New Orleans Public Service, Inc. as well as her
insurance company. The insured was apparently able to recover from New Orleans Public
Service, Inc. Therefore, the court had little difficulty in denying uninsured motorist
coverage. Id. at 271.
22. The fourth circuit again embraced the "unbroken chain of events" rationale in
Ray v. DeMaggio, 313 So. 2d 251 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
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Government Employee Insurance Co.,23 illustrates this point. In that
case, an unidentified vehicle caused a collision without making contact
with any of the involved vehicles. The unidentified vehicle made a sudden
stop at an intersection. An intervening vehicle was forced to come to
an abrupt halt behind the unidentified vehicle, but did not collide with
it. The insured, on a motorcycle, was unable to stop and struck the
rear end of the intervening vehicle.
The first circuit chose not to follow Springer, for there was no
"unbroken chain of events." The court reluctantly followed the Collins
opinion. 24 Judge Lottinger wrote both the opinion of the court and a
concurring opinion. In the concurrence, he denounced the Collins in-
terpretation.
I cannot agree that it was the intention of the legislature
in enacting the uninsured motorist law to limit the application
of this statute to only those situations where you can identify
the driver of the automobile or you can identify the automobile.
To place such a restriction on the statute defeats its purpose.
Those individuals who have no insurance are not going to be
inclined to sit around and wait for the traffic accident inves-
tigation after the accident has occurred. 25
Nevertheless, the refusal by the supreme court to review the Collins
decision persuaded the Hensley court to follow the stringent rule of that
case.
The physical contact requirement has been relaxed in another area-
where the insured strikes an object falling off of an unidentified vehicle.
In the recent case of Fore v. Traveler's Insurance Co. 6 the plaintiff,
Fore, was driving behind a truck along Interstate 10 in Louisiana. The
truck's tailgate opened and a load of dirt fell onto Fore's windshield
and hood, causing him to lose control of the vehicle and swerve off
the highway. The court followed Springer, holding that this was an
"unbroken chain of events," and that the physical contact requirement
had been met. 27 The court emphasized the fact that "there was no delay
at all between the fall and the impact with Fore's car." ' 28 Again, it is
unclear how the Fore court distinguished this case from Collins. There
was no contact between the hit-and-run vehicle and the insured's vehicle,
and under the literal reading of the policy, which the Collins court had
required, there would have been no coverage.
23. 340 So. 2d 603 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), writ denied, 342 So. 2d 224 (1977).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 608.
26. 528 So. 2d 1091 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
27. Id. at 1092.
28. Id. at 1093.
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As was the case with intervening vehicles, the courts have strictly
enforced the physical contact requirement in some cases. Harrison v.
Commercial Union Insurance Co. 29 illustrates the point. In that case the
insured's vehicle collided with phosphate bags lying in the highway.
Although the bags apparently had fallen off the back of an unidentified
truck, the second circuit refused to find coverage. This was not, said
the court, a "chain of events" situation.
Implications of the Jurisprudence
Reading these two cases together lends support to the hypothesis
that courts will deem the physical contact requirement satisfied when
there is strong corroborating evidence. In Harrison, there was no clear
proof that phosphate bags came from another vehicle, and the court
was not fully satisfied that another vehicle was involved.3 0 In Fore, the
accident left nearly unmistakable evidence of another vehicle. The court
pointed out that when Fore's windshield was replaced, there was still
dirt and debris on his car. The court went on to note that in accidents
caused by intervening objects or vehicles, tangible evidence is as likely
to remain as when direct contact between the vehicles occurs." The
point of these cases seems to be that when there is no greater danger
of fraud than when the plaintiff proves actual physical contact, then
the contact requirement should be relaxed to allow coverage.3 2
29. 471 So. 2d 922 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
30. "The trial court granted the defendant's motion finding that the plaintiffs had
not established that the bags with which they had collided fell from any vehicle what-
soever .... " Harrison, 471 So. 2d at 923. In Chapman, the court noted that it was not
known how the sugarcane came to be on the road. 517 So. 2d at 332.
31. Fore, 528 So. 2d at 1093.
32. Another category of cases in which the interpretation of the physical contact
requirement is unclear is accidents caused by contact between the insured's vehicle and
some appurtenance to another vehicle lying in the road. Suppose that the insured's vehicle
came into contact with some appurtenance to another vehicle, such as a tire assembly,
and the insured could prove that the appurtenance fell off a vehicle onto the highway.
It would be clear that the accident was caused by another vehicle. There is little danger
of fraud in this situation. The interest advanced by the physical contact requirement is
served by the circumstances of the accident. The court could possibly come to the conclusion
that the physical contact requirement has been met. It could rationalize on the basis that
a "hit-and-run vehicle" includes its appurtenances, and therefore contact with an appur-
tenance of a hit-and-run vehicle is contact with the hit-and-run vehicle as required by the
policy. Although this rationale does not strictly comply with the language of the policy
requirement of physical contact, it allows recovery when the purpose of the physical
contact requirement, prevention of fraudulent claims, is fulfilled by the circumstances of
the accident. See Adams v. Zajac, 110 Mich. App. 522, 313 N.W.2d 347 (1981). "[W]e
hold that the 'physical contact' takes place when a vehicle or an integral part of it comes
into physical contact with another vehicle." Id. at 528, 313 N.W.2d at 349.
COMMENTS
The courts in Springer and Fore seemed to realize that the interest
served by the physical contact requirement, prevention of fraud, was
equally well served by the other conditions of the accidents in those
cases. The contact of intervening vehicles in Springer and the dirt on
the car in Fore left no doubt that the accident had occurred as each
plaintiff claimed. The courts reached the equitable result by ruling that
physical contact between the hit-and-run vehicle and the insured's vehicle
includes indirect contact when there is a "clearly definable beginning
and ending." 33 Although equitable, this interpretation is inconsistent with
the Collins opinion and the language of the policy. In Hensley,3 4 the
court was left without such a mechanism to rationalize that the contact
requirement had been met.
Hensley is a good example of the inequity created by the physical
contact requirement. The risk of fraud was no greater in Hensley, but
the physical contact requirement precluded coverage. The only difference
between Springer and Hensley was that in Hensley there was no initial
contact with the unidentified vehicle. Yet the Hensley court's blind
adherence to Collins prevented it from reaching the best result, thus
disserving the polices behind the uninsured motorist statute.
In a case of an unidentified vehicle running the insured off the
road without making contact, the physical contact requirement would
preclude coverage. This would be the result whether there were one
witness or one hundred witnesses to the accident. Certainly there are
ways to prevent fraudulent claims other than this seemingly all or nothing
physical contact requirement.
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
In determing how to solve the problems created by the physical
contact requirement in Louisiana it is helpful to examine some positions
taken by other jurisdictions. A significant amount of non-conformity
exists among the state as to the statutory requirement of physical contact.
Some statutes, similar to Louisiana's, do not mention hit-and-run ve-
hicles.3" Other statutes require coverage for hit-and-run vehicles, but
provide no definition of a hit-and-run vehicle.3 6 Some statutes expressly
33. Springer, 311 So. 2d at 40.
34. 340 So. 2d 603 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), writ denied, 342 So. 2d 224 (1977).
35. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.727 (West 1984).
36. See, e.g., Me. Rev, Stat. Ann. tit. 24-A, § 2902(1) (Supp. 1987); Ill. Ann. Stat.
ch. 73, para. 755a (Smith-Hurd 1988); Iowa Code Ann. § 516A.1 (West 1988); Mass
Ann. Laws ch. 175, § 113L (Law. Co-op. 1987); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-509.01 (1984);
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:28-1.1 (West 1985); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21(b)(3) (1983).
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require that the insured prove physical contact to obtain recovery.3 7
Other statutes essentially state that physical contact is not necessary for
recovery.3" Three states in particular that limit the enforceability of the
physical contact requirement but take different approaches, are Florida,
Maine, and Georgia.
The Florida Supreme Court has articulated an interpretation contrary
to that put forth in Collins. The Florida uninsured motorist statute,
like that of Louisiana, makes no mention of hit-and-run vehicles, but
only requires that insurance companies insure personal injuries caused
by "uninsured motor vehicles." 3 9 Virtually the same question the Collins
court had faced, whether the uninsured motorist statute affected the
enforceability of the physical contact restriction, was presented to the
Florida Supreme Court in Brown v. Progressive Mutual Insurance Co.40
In Brown, an unidentified vehicle ran the insured off the highway. It
was not known whether there had been physical contact between the
vehicles. The lower court enforced the policy requirement of physical
contact and concluded that the insured was not entitled to recovery. 41
The Florida Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court.
The supreme court first stated the purpose of uninsured motorist sta-
tute's: "The purpose of the uninsured motorist statute is to protect
persons who are injured or damaged by other motorists who in turn
are not insured and cannot make whole the injured party. '42 The court
noted that the decision of the lower court had the effect of placing
"on the injured person in every case the burden of proving that the
offending party was without insurance regardless of the circumstances,
the equities or the difficulties." ' 43 In any hit-and-run accident, meeting
this burden would be impossible, resulting in nonrecovery, defeating the
purpose of the uninsured motorist statute. This could result in adverse
consequences to the general public, for "in some cases at least, injured
persons then become the burden of society or of the state, despite their
attempt to protect themselves by purchase of insurance intended to shield
them against damages inflicted by a party from whom recovery cannot
be made in person or through his insurance." 44 The court determined
37. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 28.20.445(f) (1984); Cal. Ins. Code § 11580.2(b)(1) (West
1988); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 40-284(c)(3) (1986); Miss. Code Ann. § 83-11-103 (1973); Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 690B.020 (1985); N.Y. Ins. Law § 3420(f)(3) (McKinney 1985); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 56-7-1201 (1980).
38. Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 3902 (Supp. 1988); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 379.203 (Vernon
1988); Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-2206 (1986).
39. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.727 (West 1984).
40. 249 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1971).
41. Progressive Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 229 So. 2d 645 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
42. Brown, 249 So. 2d at 430.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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that for a motorist to be protected under the state's uninsured motorist
statute, the test is not whether he can prove that the offending motorist
was uninsured, but "whether the offending motorist has insurance avail-
able for the protection of the injured party, for whose benefit the statute
was written." 5 Whenever the offending motorist flees the scene, the
test has been met. An unknown motorist does not have insurance "avail-
able for the benefit of the injured party." Therefore, "[i]f the injured
party can sustain the burden of proof that an accident did occur, he
should be entitled to recover, regardless of the actuality of physical
contact.' '46
The Florida Supreme Court recognized the inequity that can result
from the physical contact requirement and took measures to correct it.
The court effectively invalidated the physical contact requirement by
holding that its uninsured motorist statute, similar to Louisiana's required
coverage whenever the negligent driver is unidentified .4 This position
does serve the interest of protecting innocent accident victims, the in-
terests of compensating injured victims, and preventing these persons
from becoming a "burden of society." It fails, however, to serve the
interest of preventing fraudulent claims. If the injured victim is the only
witness to his one-car accident, he can easily claim that the accident
was caused by a "phantom vehicle." The insurance company can do
little to refute this testimony absent evidence of untruthful character on
the part of the insured. The jury will, of course, make the final de-
termination of the genuineness of the claim, but existing procedural
safeguards such as the proof by preponderance of the evidence rule may
not be enough to prevent fraudulent claims. The proper balance of
interests does not appear to have been struck in Florida. There is no
requirement of any amount of proof greater than the insured's testimony
as a method of preventing fraudulent claims, such as requiring eyewitness
testimony or clear and convincing evidence in the absence of a showing
of physical contact. The Louisiana courts or legislature, if either attempts
to solve the problems created by the physical contact requirement, should
proceed more cautiously than Florida has. While accident victims should
be compensated, the interest in protecting against fraudulent claims must
not be abandoned.
The uninsured motorist statute in Maine requires coverage for per-
sons "legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
... hit-and-run motor vehicles." '48 The statute does not, however, define
a "hit-and-run motor vehicle," so the identical issue regarding the
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 24-A, § 2902(1) (Supp. 1987).
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physical contact rule arises. In Lanzo v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., 49 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine addressed the
issue of whether the phrase "hit-and-run" requires actual physical con-
tact. The court noted the split in authority on the interpretation of this
phrase50 and determined that "[tihe short hand expression 'hit-and-run'
as used in the statute, serves to describe an accident involving an
unknown driver and does not create a requirement that the accident
involve physical contact."'" Because the policy requirement of physical
contact excluded coverage required by the statute, the statute prevailed.12
The physical contact requirement was not enforced and recovery was
granted. 3
The Lanzo opinion leaves the same problem as Florida's Brown
opinion in terms of striking the proper balance of interests. There is
still no mechanism for the prevention of fraudulent claims. If the only
evidence is the testimony of the insured, there is a significant risk of
fraud. This risk can be reduced by requiring more proof when the
offending vehicle is unknown. This type of requirement could be set
forth by the courts, or perhaps more appropriately by statute.
Georgia's uninsured motorist statute expressly requires physical con-
tact for recovery when the offending vehicle is unknown, but with an
exception: "[Proof of] physical contact shall not be required if the
description by the claimant of how the occurrence occurred is corrob-
orated by an eyewitness to the occurrence other than the claimant. 5 4
This requirement of corroboration seems to protect insurance companies
from fraudulent claims adequately. At the same time it provides cov-
erage for most genuine miss-and-run accidents provided there is eye-
witness testimony. Of course, some actual but unverifiable accidents
would not be covered even under the Georgia statute. For example, an
49. 524 A.2d 47 (Me. 1987).
50. The court cited Ferega v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 58 Il1.
2d 109, 317 N.E.2d 550 (1974) and Ely v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
148 Ind. App. 586, 268 N.E.2d 316 (1971) as cases that uphold the policy provisions
requiring physical contact. The court then cited several cases which have voided similar
policy provisions, including Surrey v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 384 Mass. 171,
424 N.E.2d 234 (1981); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Abramowicz,
386 A.2d 670 (Del. 1978); Soule v. Stuyvesant Insurance Co., 116 N.H. 595, 364 A.2d
883 (1976); and Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Novak, 83 Wash. 2d 576, 520
P.2d 1368 (1974).
51. Lanzo, 524 A.2d at 50.
52. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 513
A.2d 283, 285 (Me. 1986).
53. Lanzo, 524 A.2d at 50.
54. Ga. Code Ann. § 33-7-11(b)(2) (Supp. 1988).
55. See Universal Security Insurance Co. v. Lowery, 257 Ga. 363, 359 S.E.2d 898
(1987), which holds that the corroborating witness need not be a disinterested witness.
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accident victim driving alone with no witnesses to the accident when
there is no contact would not be covered under this approach. But this
seems necessary to prevent fraudulent claims. Georgia's approach strikes
a compromise between competing interests and is a reasonable solution
to the problem. 6
A statute that requires uninsured motorist coverage for hit-and-run
accidents whenever there is physical contact or corroboration by an
eyewitness would not affect the approach taken by Louisiana courts in
cases involving contact with intervening vehicles or other objects. Courts
probably would continue to hold that contact with an intervening vehicle
or object meets the physical contact requirement if there is an unbroken
chain of events.57 As discussed earlier, this rationale, however equitable
it may be, is inconsistent with the clear language of the policy provision
since the unknown vehicle does not come into direct physical contact
with the insured or his vehicle."
PosSILE SOLUTIONS: JUDICIAL OR LEGISLATIVE
If Louisiana courts continue to follow the Collins rule, only a
legislative act will alleviate the problems created by that interpretation.
In cases in which there is clear proof of the facts of the accident and
little danger of fraud, there needs to be a way to provide coverage,
despite the physical contact requirement imposed by insurance companies.
In these cases, allowing recovery would fulfill the general purpose of
uninsured motorist coverage. To find a reasonable solution to this prob-
lem a balance must be struck between protecting insurance companies
from fraudulent claims and protecting innocent victims and society from
hit-and-run and miss-and-run motorists.
It is suggested that when the insured cannot prove physical contact,
some higher burden of proof be mandated. For example, in the absence
of a showing of physical contact, the insured could recover if the accident
is corroborated by at least one independent eyewitness. This would give
the insured an alternative means of recovery when there is no physical
contact but little risk of fraud. If the claim is fraudulent, it will be
more difficult for the insured to assert a claim if he must procure the
testimony of an eyewitness. However, a victim of a genuine miss-and-
run accident would still not recover where there are no witnesses. This
is the cost of striking a balance between preventing fraudulent claims
and compensating innocent accident victims. Simply invalidating the
56. See also Or. Rev. Stat. § 743.792 (1981).
57. See, e.g., Fore v. Travelers Ins. Co., 528 So. 2d 1091, 1092 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1988) and Springer v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 311 So. 2d 36, 39 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1975).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20 and 33.
19891
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
contact requirement will leave insurance companies completely exposed
to the fraudulent claims of one-car accident victims. If there are no
witnesses to the accident other than the insured and the jury believes
the testimony of the insured, the insurance company will have no way
to rebut his claim that he was driven off the road by an unidentified
negligent driver.
Another alternative in the absence of physical contact or eyewitnesses
would be to allow the insured to recover if he proves by clear and
convincing evidence that the accident occurred as claimed. Evidence that
could be used to meet this standard would include skid marks or the
presence of an intervening vehicle or other object that could be positively
linked to an unidentified vehicle. If the insured must either prove physical
contact or prove by clear and convincing evidence that the accident
occurred, then both of the competing interests would be adequately
served. The insured would have a remedy even without physical contact,
while the insurance companies would be protected against fraudulent
claims.
Although cases involving contact with intervening vehicles and ob-
jects have been treated inconsistently with the language of the policies,
they have been treated equitably. In cases when there is an unbroken
chain of events, the courts allow recovery because there is little danger
of fraud. The reasoning has been questionable, but the results have been
fair. If the legislature attempts to solve the physical contact problem,
for example, by providing coverage only in cases involving physical
contact or corroboration by an eyewitness, the courts could still rely
on these cases to reach fair results.
This solution, however, may create more problems than it solves.
It may be difficult for a plaintiff to determine whether the given situation
provides proof by clear and convincing evidence that the accident was
caused by the fault of an unidentified driver. It is likely that plaintiffs
will attempt to enforce their claims even when there is no clear proof
of the accident. In other words, this new standard may tend to encourage
litigation. A bright-line test may be desirable to determine whether
recovery should be granted.
CONCLUSION
Louisiana's solution to the inequities created by the physical contact
requirement can be obtained through the courts or by the legislature.
Should the legislature maintain the status quo, Louisiana courts, when
faced with a clearly genuine accident victim, may continue to relax the
physical contact requirement whenever it can find adequate justification.5 9
59. The court relaxed the contact requirement in Springer and Fore. See supra notes
15 and 26.
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Otherwise, the courts are likely to follow Collins and deny recovery. It
is urged, however, that the courts take a different approach. Louisiana's
uninsured motorist statute could be interpreted to mandate coverage
whenever the negligent driver is unknown. The courts could apply this
interpretation to totally invalidate the physical contact requirement. How-
ever, this would not strike the proper balance of interests. The court
should instead apply the interpretation to limit the physical contact
requirement to only those situations in which there is no corroborating
eyewitness. This would more closely maintain the proper balance between
the interests of preventing fraudulent claims and compensating innocent
accident victims. If the courts continue to follow the Collins interpre-
tation, the solution is left in the hands of the legislature.
It is urged that the Legislature take some steps to follow the lead
of Georgia to a more reasonable and equitable approach to the issue.
This can be done by amending La. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(i) to require
uninsured motorist coverage for "hit-and-run" accidents when there is
either physical contact or corroboration by an eyewitness.
Ronald Whitney
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